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This paper reports on two voluntary, contributory, contextualised, community-based health
insurance (CBHI) schemes, launched in Dhading and Banke (Nepal) in 2011. The implementation
followed a four-stage process: initiating (baseline survey), involving (awareness generation and
engaging community in benefit-package-design), launch (enrolment and training of selected
community members) and post-launch (viable claims ratio, settled within satisfactory time, sus-
tainable affiliation). Both schemes were successful on four key parameters: effective planning;
affiliation (grew from 0 to ~10,000) and renewals (>65 per cent); claims ratio (~50 per cent); and
promptness of claim settlement (~23 days). This model succeeded in implementing CBHI with
zero premium subsidies or subsidised health-care costs. The successful operation relied in large
part on the fact that members trust that they can enforce this contract. Considerable insurance
education and capacity development is necessary before the launch of the CBHI, and for sustain-
able operations as well as for scaling.
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Introduction
In countries where governments can neither mandate contributory universal health coverage
(UHC) nor subsidise its full cost, one of the great challenges is reducing private out-of-
pocket expenditure (OPE) for health care payable at the point and time of service. This
inequitable and inefficient health financing mechanism1 persists in many low-income
countries.2 In Nepal, the third poorest country in Asia, OPE represents around 72 per cent
1 Garg and Karan (2009).
2 Xu et al. (2010).
of total health-care costs.3 The World Health Organization proposes the introduction of
prepayment and risk pooling as a way to solve this problem.4 Several experiments with
community-based health insurance (CBHI) have been reported5,6,7; in Nepal, experiments
with CBHI have been carried out since 2004, both in rural and in urban settings.8,9 Most
projects depended on external subsidies and offered provider-based health insurance with
a restricted choice of health-care services. Recently, the Government of Nepal has shown
interest in universal health care (UHC) through implementation of health insurance10;
however, it has neither launched a national scheme nor entered into arrangements with
commercial insurers to secure an ample supply of health insurance, notably in difficult-to-
reach locations. Rather, it has designated several “pilot” districts for experimentation with
several models, notably CBHI. This paper addresses the question whether and how it is
possible to operate sustainable health insurance in the informal sector in rural Nepal without
premium subsidies, and what useful role communities can play in the self-governance of
their insurance.
We present here the voluntary and contributory CBHI model that has been piloted in
Nepal. The empirical scope covers CBHI operations from 2011 until 2013. The novelty of
this implementation model is its combination of high-resolution data collection and analysis,
reliance on revenue generation on a voluntary basis rather than on premium subsidies, and
capacity development. The conceptual framework of this model includes tailoring benefits to
local risks at premiums perceived locally as affordable; involving prospective beneficiaries
in benefit package design to ensure that their perceived priorities are given voice; assigning
responsibility for governance of the schemes to members, to reduce conflicts of interests and
enhance the likelihood that benefits are paid as promised; and localising operations of the
scheme at community level with suitable capacity development.
The paper is structured as follows: we provide details on the location, data and methods used
in this study, followed by a description of the implementation model. The findings, reflecting
the experience during two full years of operation using established performance indicators,
follow. We interpret the findings in the discussion section, and end by formulating conclusions,
notably on sustainability and scalability of this CBHI implementation model, and its potential
contribution to achieving the social policy goals of the Government of Nepal.
Data and methods
The CBHI schemes studied
This paper describes the implementation of two schemes: Saubhagya, launched in January
2011 in Dhading district by a consortium composed of Development Project Service Centre
3 World Bank (2007).
4 World Health Organization (2011).
5 Biener and Eling (2012).
6 Mahal et al. (2013).
7 Borghi et al. (2013).
8 GIZ Health Sector Support Program, Department of Health Services (2012).
9 Stoermer (2012).
10
“National Health Insurance Policy 2012” of the Government of Nepal.
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(DEPROSC),11 Micro Insurance Academy (MIA)12 and Save the Children Nepal (STC).13
Sanjeevni was launched in June 2011 in Banke district by a consortium composed of
Nirdhan Utthan Bank (Nirdhan),14 MIA and STC.
Data sources
This paper is based on three data sources.
A baseline study
Conducted from January to April 2009, it included a household survey, focus group
discussions (FGDs) and key informant interviews15 to gather information on socio-economic
and demographic features, health-seeking patterns and how the local population financed
access to health care. A two-stage sampling method was applied. The first entailed purposive
selection of “village development committees” (VDC) and wards (administrative divisions
smaller than districts) to include the places the field partners designated for implementation
of the CBHI schemes. The second stage included selection of intervention and control
groups; the intervention groups included those to whom the CBHI was going to be offered
(often organised as “self-reliant groups” (SRG) numbering about 15–20 people who were
affiliated with DEPROSC in Dhading and with Nirdhan in Banke)16; the control groups, of
equal size, were not invited to join. We call these sub-cohorts “members” and “non-
members”, respectively.
The sample consisted of 1,000 households from Dhading and 1,008 households from
Banke. The sample size was calculated based on an error margin of 0.005 (for estimation
of the hospitalisation rate with a prior estimated value of 0.04), a confidence interval of
80 per cent and a design effect of 2.17 We interviewed a members sample comprised of
504 households randomly sampled from 17 VDCs in Banke (from Nirdhan’s list), respecting
a proportional number of members in the local ward population (member strength in Ward
to member strength in VDC)18; and a random sample of 500 households in Dhading from
the list of DEPROSC members (covering nine VDCs).19 The non-members were selected
randomly in each village, following the “four winds” method.20
For the purpose of analysis of the results of the implementation, only members’ household
baseline data are used.
11 http://www.deprosc.org.np/Home.aspx
12 http://www.microinsuranceacademy.org/
13 http://www.savethechildren.org/site/c.8rKLIXMGIpI4E/b.6150545/k.B8DE/Nepal.htm
14 http://www.nirdhan.com/
15 Dror and Radermacher (2010).
16 An SRG is a group of 10–15 women who agree to deposit a fixed amount every month in a common kitty.
When a member is in need of money, she can borrow the amount from the common kitty. She pays a service
charge (equivalent to interest) to the group fund. Each SRG has a bank account in the name of the group.
17 Cochran (1977).
18 With the following breakdown by VDC: 99 households in Bageswari, 33 in Banratuwa, 4 in Belbhar, 28 in
Chisapani, 12 in Indrapur, 3 in Jaispur, 6 in Khajurapur, 124 in Kohalpur, 24 in Manikapur, 26 in Navabasta,
18 in Paraspur, 12 in Rajapur, 63 in Rajhaina, 10 in Sahigaon, 5 in Samserganj, 20 in Sitapur and 17 in Titanaria.
19 Breakdown by VDCs was follows: 98 households in Baireni, 12 in Benighat, 21 in Bhumesthan, 21 in Dhusha,
43 in Gajuri, 86 in Jogimara, 42 in Kalleri, 70 in Kumpur, and 107 in Pida.
20 Som (1996).
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The average monthly per capita consumption (MPCC) of the members sub-cohorts as
per the baseline was Napalese rupees (NPR) 2,402 ±77.6 (= purchasing power parity (PPP)
$ 82±2.65) at Dhading and NPR 1,979 ±58.2 (= PPP$ 68±1.99) at Banke.21 Estimated
literacy rates of members sub-cohorts at Dhading and Banke were 81 and 82 per cent,
respectively. The female literacy rate was 75 per cent in both places. The average family size
was 5.63 (±0.08) in Banke and 5.24 (±0.06) in Dhading. In all, 29 per cent of houses in
Banke were permanent housing structures (“pacca houses”), compared with only 13 per cent
in Dhading (Table 1).
Results of simulations at the design phase
During the preparatory stage, a series of simulation exercises were conducted with groups
(each of about 15 SRG members) to obtain data on the benefits and compositions that might
suit best. The results of these simulation exercises were recorded and served as one data
source at various stages of the implementation process.
Actual results of the schemes
Data was obtained from the books of accounts (e.g. number of paid-up members, premiums
collected and payments made to members) and operational records of the CBHI schemes
(notably information on number of claims, time needed to process those claims and number
of meetings of the claims committees).
Essentials of the implementation model
The business process of implementation of this CBHI model follows four consecutive stages
(see Appendix A).
Initiating: Initiating refers to the preparatory stage in which success implies the garnering of
adequate information—on local willingness to pay, incidence of illness and costs—needed
for provision of sound actuarial and other technical advice. In Nepal this information was
gathered through the baseline study conducted in 2009.
Table 1 Socio-demographic profile of respondents
Dhading Banke
MPCC (NPR) 2402± 77.6 1979± 58.2
MPCC (PPP$) 82± 2.65 68± 1.99
Total literacy 81% 82%
Female literacy 75% 75%
Average family size 5.24± 0.06 5.63± 0.08
House type (permanent structure) 13% 29%
Predominant religion Hindu Hindu
Predominant language Nepali Nepali
21 Conversion rate PPP$ 1=NPR 29.25, in year 2009. The per capita per month GNI of Nepal was estimated at
100 PPP$ for the year 2009.
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Involving: Involving refers to the stage in which success implies that the target groups are
able to form consensus on the design and pricing of the benefit package for their community,
pursuant to participation in awareness and capacity-building activities. This was done in
2010.
Launch: Launch refers to the stage in which success implies two things: that CBHI members
choose some members to be the office-bearers to manage and govern the scheme, and that
enrolments reflect the community’s consensus that insurance (through the customised benefit
package) is better than no insurance.
Post-launch: Post-launch refers to the stage in which success implies that the loss ratio is
viable, that claims are settled in a contextually satisfactory time frame, that the income from
membership (new and renewals) is adequate to fund sustained operations, that community
consensus on the benefit package extends into subsequent years, and that the CBHI has the
capacity to satisfy the community’s ongoing technical support needs.
At the Initiating stage, the target community agrees to cooperate with an external body
in surveying local conditions of risk exposure and perceptions of priorities about
risk. Unremunerated interviewees share information; they expect a return, which (in this
implementation model) is a promise to propose the insurance that could improve their
lives. This engagement with the external organisers establishes agreed roles: the expert
collects data and offers knowledge-based recommendations and the community decides on
the action. Stated differently, the external expert (in this case the Micro Insurance
Academy—MIA) acts as “change maker” and the local community acts as “decision-
maker”. The decisions are taken during the Involving stage, when the target group is
engaged in benefit package design. The package that communities can compose may differ
radically from anything offered by an insurer (if any offer exists at all). The assumption
underlying this stage of the process is that, when prospective enrollees can participate in
composing the package that reflects their perceived priorities, they will be more willing to
affiliate and to pay. For as long as there is no willingness to pay (WTP), there can be no
demand; asserting needs without solvent demand leads nowhere, and the necessary
condition towards expanding health insurance coverage is that solvent demand exists
where none existed before. The essential success of Involving is when the target group
reaches consensus that being health-insured is “what we all do”, at a price that we all are
willing to pay. This also means that Involving is essentially a group decision rather than an
individual choice.
Had there been ample competition in the supply of health insurance, the community could
have shopped around for the package and price they wanted. But, the supply of insurance to
the informal sector in Nepal is insufficient, both in terms of coverage and in terms of
premium competition. Therefore, the Launch stage includes a decision by the community to
act as “market maker” for the benefit package chosen by its members at the price they are
willing to pay. As the community now needs the skills required to operate the scheme, the
assistance must include a “competence chain” through which local persons are trained in
skills they need to operate the insurance. The key roles are briefly described next.
The “insurance activists” (IAs) are the first line of managing the CBHI scheme; they move
from village to village and door to door to enrol members, maintain direct contact with
members, provide information, collect premiums, assist members to avail services (e.g.
guide to certain health-care providers) and in submitting claims, etc. In Dhading each of the
six IAs covers 150 members, while in Banke, each of the five IAs covers 455 members.
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This large gap in member per IA reflects the time/effort required to reach the members in
their villages in very different terrains. The IAs are employed by the CBHI and draw a
monthly payment.
Another role is that of “insurance coordinator” (IC) who keeps membership records and
books of accounts using a management information system provided by MIA, manages the
bank account, and may also maintain relationships with health-care providers. From 2011
onwards, one IC was employed in Dhading and two in Banke.
Claims for reimbursement are adjudicated by the “Claims Committee” (CC). The CC is
composed of one representative from each VDC where the members live, designated/elected
by the “self-reliant groups” to sit on the CC. Candidates must be literate, understand the
claims process and be able to make decisions promptly. In Dhading, seven CCs with 42
members were active in 2011, and eight CCs comprising 49 members in 2012, and the
increase in 2012 was occasioned by the addition of two VDC populations; in Banke there
were five CCs with seven members each operating in 2011 and in 2012. CC members meet
once a month and receive a “sitting fee”.
Finally, the “Coordination Committee” (CoCo) supervises the overall financial perfor-
mance of the scheme. The CoCo meets monthly; reviews the financial performance; signs
checks, policy documents and claim overview documents22; conducts client dispute
resolution, etc. In Dhading there was one CoCo, with seven members in 2011 and eight
members in 2012. In Banke (where the CoCo is called “Main Committee”), one committee
operated with seven members in 2011 and 2012. CoCo members are paid a sitting fee by the
scheme.
Results
The results of the Nepali CBHI schemes are examined here against nine pieces of essential
information, some of which follow accepted performance indicators.23
Willingness to pay
Before launching a new CBHI, it is essential to have an estimate of WTP for health insurance
among the target group (especially when the expected income from premium subsidies is
zero) because WTP is used as a proxy for premiums that define the limits of the benefit
package. The baseline survey includes elicitation of WTP. There are several methods to
obtain this estimate24; we used the descending bidding game method,25 which consisted of
asking each interviewee how much she/he would agree to pay for health insurance that
would cover part of the cost of their health care on the basis that, if you are willing to pay
more, you will get more benefits and, if you are willing to pay less, you will get fewer
22 The claim overview document is a document generated by the MIS application following submission of a claim.
The system validates the claim amount under different benefit heads and calculates the amount payable based
on the amount already received by the claimant. This calculation helps the CoCo to verify that decisions on the
claim taken by the CC are fine.
23 Wipf and Garand (2010).
24 Dror and Koren (2012).
25 Dror et al. (2007).
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benefits. The opening bid (of NPR 30 per person per month)26 was intended to be refused as
too high; when a bid was refused, a lower bid (1 NPR less) was offered, repeatedly, until a
bid was accepted or the bid reached NPR 0. The accepted bid was recorded as the
respondent’s WTP. The median WTP was NPR 10.0 in Dhading and NPR 10.5 in Banke.
All results of the bidding game are shown in Figures 1 and 2.
We also considered another method to estimate WTP, based on mean food expenditure.27
The advantage of this method is that it bases the estimate of WTP on actual costs of known
goods, rather than on unknown costs of uncertain services. By applying this method in
Nepal, the first approximation of WTP was NPR 41±1 in Dhading and NPR 38±1 in Banke
(about 4.5 per cent of mean food expenditure of the target population).
These two estimates of WTP, though markedly different, are taken as the lower and upper
boundaries of scheme revenues within which the benefit package can be designed.
Benefit package design and pricing
It is known that benefit package design is an exercise in rationing limited resources.28 Two
key issues underlie this rationing exercise: firstly, the benefits must reflect local health needs
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Figure 2. Results of the bidding game for WTP, Sanjeevni Banke.
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Figure 1. Results of the bidding game for WTP, Saubhagya Dhading.
26 An indicative exchange rate is 100 NPR=1 USD.
27 Binnendijk et al. (2013).
28 Ryan et al. (2001).
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and local availability of health services; secondly, the people in the target population must
agree to the rationing decisions, as they can refuse enrolment, which is voluntary.
We apply a modified version of a preference elicitation method called CHAT (Choosing
Healthplans All Together) that has been successfully applied in many locations in rural
India.25,29 In the first stage of the process (known as the design workshop stage), the
community (through its representatives) is shown many benefit package options, each with a
particular premium. Through an iterative process of deliberations, the participants select four
to five options that match the needs and WTP of the community. It is noted that the price
reflects pure actuarial premiums plus about 30 per cent to cover risk loading and
administrative expenses (incurred by the community in running the scheme), but without
profit or any other cost (and no payment to MIA). The four or five benefit package options
selected in the design workshop are then disseminated in the community (through pictorial
paper boards called CHAT Boards; the CHAT board used in 2011 is attached as Appendix B
for illustration), for discussion and decision. The package selected by the largest number of
groups is retained for the entire scheme. A total of 47 such group discussions took place in
Dhading and 81 in Banke. The CHAT and benefit/premium selection process is repeated
each year, to allow the communities to adjust their priorities based on experience, and to
increase coverage when WTP increases. Prior to preparation of new CHAT boards for 2012,
a series of 24 FGDs were conducted in Dhading in June 2012 to elicit opinions on changes in
the benefits and premiums for the next year. These FGDs led to proposals30 which were
considered during the “redesign workshop” by community representatives (CC and CoCo
members). The CHAT exercises were administered among enrolled members and among
non-members, with the view to enrolling more members.
The package options (those considered and those retained) for 2011 and 2012 are shown
in Table 2.
Involving people in the CHAT exercises is a hands-on demonstration of the interplay
between premiums on the one hand, and the width of benefits and depth of coverage, on the
other. This experience helps manage expectations to realistic dimensions and minimises
disappointments with reimbursements.
The premium levels that were chosen by the groups were within the estimated range
of WTP (i.e. between NPR 10 and NPR 41±1 in Dhading, and between NPR 10.5 and
NPR 38±1 in Banke) and closer to the higher limits.
As for the package design, the choices clearly favoured broad packages that included both
outpatient and inpatient coverage. However, the cost of covering medicines was too high to
be retained. The apparent trade-off was to choose a lower cap for hospital reimbursements.
It is also interesting to note that the benefit choices in Dhading and Banke were different
from each other in Year 1 and converged towards more similarity in Year 2.
Based on the CHAT choices, the schemes implemented the packages described in
Table 3.
It is noteworthy that the Dhading scheme changed the method of calculating caps,
from a cap per person per year (pppy) to a dual cap per event (p.e.) and per family per year
29 Danis et al. (2007).
30 For example, in Dhading in 2012, the community mentioned injury to be a part of the benefit package, and later
a survey among 455 members was conducted to calculate the probability and cost of injury.
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Table 2 Benefit package options and premiums—including final selection per year per community (in Nepalese rupees)
Benefit options Dhading Banke
2011 2012 2011 2012
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4
Hospitalisation 5,000 4,000 5,000 6,000 4,000 2,500 3,000 4,000 5,000 2,500 2,000 4,000 5,000 4,000 5,000 2,500 4,000 3,000 2,000
Imaging 500 400 500 400 600 700 600 400 250 500 1,000 1,000 1,000 300 250 400 600
Lab tests 600 250 400 250 250 400 500 400 250 200 250 250 500 1,000 200 200 250 400
Transport 200 400 300 200 100 100 200 200 200 200
Wage loss @100/d @100/d
Medicines 500
Premium PPPMa 23.1 24.5 24.7 25.4 26.2 21.1 28 31.7 34.3 76.4 20 30.3 35.1 36.1 38.8 28.3 33.3 33.8 35
Groups chose this 3/47 0 7/47 0 37/47 7/91 78/91 1/91 2/91 3/91 40/81 5/ 81 0 4/81 32/81 9/180 7/180 1/180 163/180
% of group choices 6% 0% 15% 0% 79% 8% 86% 1% 2% 3% 49% 6% 0% 5% 40% 5% 4% 1% 90%
Final selection ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
aPer person per month: During the CHAT, the premiums paid per month are shown to the community for the purpose of simplicity.
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(pfpy). This method of calculating the benefit, called “family floater”,31 increases the
coverage amount available to sick individuals within a family unit; yet, there is no evidence
thus far of adverse selection, with the notable exception that family size of the insured is
smaller than expected, when larger family size could have been expected. One lesson might
be to link the application of the family floater with an obligation to affiliate entire families,
which could reduce the financial risk for the scheme and enhance the inclusive nature
of the scheme.
Membership in the CBHI
Enrolment into the schemes was open during “affiliation periods” lasting two months;
enrolment was not possible outside these affiliation periods. The evolution of membership
numbers until 31 January 2013 is shown in Table 4.
Overall, membership numbers doubled from Year 1 (2011) to Year 2 (2012), with
satisfactory renewal rates in Dhading, and relatively lower rates in Banke.
Table 3 The implemented benefits packages
Benefit type Conditions Year 1 Year 2
Banke
Sanjeevni
Dhading
Saubhagya
Banke
Sanjeevni
Dhading
Saubhagya
Hospitalisation
benefit
All hospitalisations >24 h covered; only from
selected hospitals: government and private; all
direct hospital costs covered; hospital bill +
medicines needed and bought during
hospitalisation in pharmacy outside hospital +
tests and imaging prescribed and done during
hospitalisation in testing centre outside hospital
pppya:
NPR
2,000
pppy: NPR
4,000
pppy:
NPR
2,000
p.e.b:
3,000;
pfpy:
20,000
Transportation
benefit
A one-time flat amount compensation for
transportation costs for all hospitalisations of at
least 24 h
NPR 100 NPR 400 NPR 200 NPR 300
Imaging tests
benefit
Imaging test prescribed by the doctors of selected
hospitals and done in an outpatient setting (not
during hospitalisation of more than 24 h)
pppy:
NPR 250
pppy: NPR
500
pppy:
NPR 600
p.e.: NPR
600; pfpyc:
3,000
Lab tests
benefit
Lab tests prescribed by the doctors of selected
hospitals and done in an outpatient setting (not
during hospitalisation of more than 24 h)
pppy:
NPR 200
pppy: NPR
250
pppy:
NPR 400
p.e.: NPR
400; pfpy:
3,000
apppy=maximum amount insurance will pay out per person per year.
bp.e.=maximum amount insurance will pay per event.
cpfpy=maximum amount insurance will pay out per family per year.
31 In a family floater policy, the cap limits total payout to the family, instead of an event or an individual. In case
someone becomes sick multiple times, she/he can take advantage of the higher per family cover.
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Household size of the insured population
The mean household size of the members sub-cohort in the baseline survey was 5.24± 0.063
in Dhading and 5.63±0.075 in Banke (data sourced from baseline survey). Surprisingly, the
average household size of enrolled members was significantly lower, at 2.85±0.035 in
Dhading and 2.44±0.019 in Banke (obtained from membership records). This big difference
raises the question which demographic segment has been excluded by families.
Table 5, providing the age and gender distributions of the two groups (the sampled
“member” sub-cohort in the household survey vs the actual CBHI membership), shows
clearly that adult women are over-represented in the insured cohort, compared with men and
with their proportion in the overall population (household survey data). And, young girls are
under-represented among the insured, compared both with young boys and with their share
in the population.
Incidence of claims
We compare the expected and actual incidence of claims for the three main benefit types
that formed the basis of members’ benefits premium package choice, based on two years’
experience. The results are summarised in Table 6.
The agreement between expected and actual incidence of hospital claims is very good in
Banke and in the second batch of affiliation in Dhading; the first batch of enrollees in
Dhading had lower incidence than expected, which may reflect that the number of enrolled
was too small to represent the target group correctly.
As for imaging and lab claims, actual incidence was lower than expected in Banke, and
this could explain the decision of both schemes to increase the cap for this benefit in Year 2,
to offset the lower incidence by higher reimbursement at a similar premium. This suggests
that the insured understood the pricing mechanism very well. The agreement between
expected and observed number of claims suggests that adverse selection, moral hazard and
Table 4 Membership in the CBHIs
Enrolment period Enrolment
status
Total members
per scheme
Renewal % Total
project
New Renew Total Saubhagya
Dhading
Sanjeevni
Banke
Saubhagya
Dhading
Sanjeevni
Banke
2011 January 514 514 514 514
2011 June 4,176 4,176 4,690
2011 July 394 394 908 5,084
2012 January 1,066 349 1,415 1,809 67.9% 5,985
2012 June 5,818 2,063 7,881 49.4% 9,690
2012 July 391 254 645 2,060 64.5% 9,941
2013 January 1,753 965 2,718 3,363 68.2% 11,244
31 Dec. 2011 5,084
31 Dec. 2012 9,941
31 Jan. 2013 11,244
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Table 5 Age and gender distribution (“members” cohort in the household survey vs insured population)
Age Dhading baseline
members sample
Dhading
insured
Significance of difference
gender ratio in
HHS vs insured
Banke baseline
members sample
Banke
insured
Significance of difference
gender ratio in
HHS vs insured
Male Female Male Female p-value Male Female Male Female p-value
<6 11.7% 11.5% 13.3% 5.9% 0.000 9.6% 11.0% 16.6% 7.2% 0.000
6–15 25.3% 25.1% 25.6% 15.2% 0.000 22.9% 23.3% 32.5% 14.1% 0.000
15–59 56.5% 58.6% 55.4% 74.4% 0.000 61.8% 59.8% 46.7% 75.1% 0.000
60 + 6.4% 4.8% 5.7% 4.4% 0.000 5.7% 5.9% 4.2% 3.5% 0.000
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 0.000 100% 100% 100% 100% 0.000
n 1,699 1,269 1,377 1,381 NA 7,927 4,154 1,452 1,478 NA
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fraud seem to be in good control. This is an interesting observation, which may reflect
community governance of the scheme.
Cost of reimbursable claims
The actual costs paid by the CBHI schemes were compared with the expected costs that were
simulated by using the members cohort in the household data, applying identical insurance
rules (results shown in Table 7).
As can be seen, the actual and expected average costs per claim are remarkably similar,
even though, in three cases, the difference is significant (unpaired Student’s t-test). These
results confirm that it is possible to base the actuarial calculations underlying package design
on the baseline data.
Loss ratio (a.k.a. claims ratio)
Loss ratio (i.e. the amount paid as benefits divided by the total premium income) is a measure
of the financial stability of the scheme, providing an indication of the adequacy of premiums
charged relative to underwritten risk. The data shown (Table 8) refers to the first full year
for which all claims were settled. The loss ratio is satisfactory and confirms that the two
schemes collected suitable premiums. Note that in Dhading, the loss ratio of the second
batch of enrollees was 56.7 per cent, higher by about 40 per cent from the first batch (with
40 per cent), but still within a very suitable range.
Table 6 Comparison between expected and actual incidence of claims
Incidence
district
Hospitalisations Imaging Lab tests
Actual
(%)
Expected
(%)
p-valuea Actual
(%)
Expected
(%)
p-valuea Actual
(%)
Expected
(%)
p-valuea
Dhading (January 2011) 2.1 3.7 0.225 13.4 15.9 0.484 10.5 18.5 0.001
Dhading (July 2011) 3.3 3.7 0.934 18.3 15.9 0.587 10.9 18.5 0.006
Banke (June 2011) 3.3 3.1 0.878 14.8 22.2 0.000 11.8 34.1 0.000
aChi-square test.
Table 7 Comparison between expected and actual cost of claims
Mean cost per claim
(NPR)
Hospitalisations Imaging Lab
district Actual
(paid)±
SEMa
Expected±
SEM
Actual±
SEM
Expected±
SEM
Actual±
SEM
Expected±
SEM
Dhading (January 2011) 3094± 356 3303± 106 332± 18 395± 25 198± 10 197± 10
Dhading (July 2011) 3250± 302 3303± 106 313± 17 395± 25 217± 9 197± 10
Banke (June 2011) 1665± 45 1853± 34 225± 2 228± 6 162± 5 161± 6
aSEM= standard error of the mean.
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Value for money
One way to express “value for money” for the insured is to look at the probability that the
claims submitted will be fully reimbursed. It is self-explanatory that the cap is designed to
curtail some costs, and the probability of full reimbursement increases as the cap increases,
but so do the premiums. The outcomes were as follows: in Dhading, in 2011 (the first year
for which all claims were settled), 48 per cent of hospitalisations were fully reimbursed; in
Banke, the rate was 41 per cent. This coverage seems too low. The share of claims that would
have been fully paid at different levels of the cap, and the corresponding premiums are
shown in Figures 3 and 4.
As can be seen, a small increase in a low cap occasions relatively better coverage for a
modest premium increase, since the two lines in the graph are not parallel or linear (e.g. the
range from 4,000 to 6,000 ≈ PPP$136.80 to PPP$205.10). For example, had the cap been
increased from NPR 4,000 to NPR 5,000 in Dhading, 78 per cent of hospital claims would
have been fully covered, while the premium would have increased by only NPR 23 pppy
(from NPR 123 to 146).
In Dhading, some 89 per cent of imaging claims were fully covered with a cap of 500, and
in Banke, only 24 per cent were fully covered when the cap was 250. It is interesting to note
that both CBHI schemes chose a cap of 600 in 2012; this corrective choice seems suitable for
Banke, but less necessary for Dhading. Finally, 45 per cent of lab claims in Dhading were
fully covered (with a cap of 250), and 34 per cent in Banke (cap of 200). Both schemes chose
to raise the cap to 400 in the following year. The involvement of communities in package
Table 8 Loss ratio (a.k.a. claims ratio) for the first year
Location No. of
insured
Premium income
(in NPR)
No. of
claims
Claim amount
(in NPR)
Loss
ratio (%)
Dhading (January 2011) 514 172,704 104 69,063 40.0
Dhading (July 2011) 394 132,384 104 74,998 56.7
Banke (June 2011) 4,177 1,052,352 810 461,830 43.9
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Figure 3. Coverage levels at different caps/hospitalisations (Dhading).
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revision offered the opportunity to adjust perceived value for money and the resulting
interest to remain insured.
Members’ experience of the claims process
Of 810 claims submitted in Dhading, only four claims were rejected (less than half of 1 per
cent, due to client fraud or incomplete bills submitted by members). No claim rejections were
registered in Banke.
Another way of measuring the experience of insured persons is the time interval
between claim submission and reimbursement. We measured promptness in three
distinct ways: firstly, how long it took from submission to the IA until the claims were
decided by the CC; secondly, the delay from decision by the CC to actual payment to
members; and thirdly, the promptness of the entire process from a member’s claim
submission until reimbursement. The results are shown in Table 9.
Bills were paid within one month on average. Considering that the CC meets once a month
and that the IA needs to visit villages to collect claims and prepare them for decisions, and
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Figure 4. Coverage levels at different caps/hospitalisations (Banke).
Table 9 Promptness of claims reimbursement
Scheme district Enrolment
period
Batch
covered
(months)
# Days from
submission to
CC decision
# Days from
CC decision
to payment
# Days from
submission to
payment
Mean± SEM Mean± SEM Mean± SEM
Saubhagya Dhading January 2011 12 14± 0.98 15± 0.72 28± 1.08
July 2011 12 10± 0.80 12± 0.44 23± 0.85
January 2012 10 10± 0.42 11± 0.22 21± 0.48
July 2012 4 11± 0.95 12± 0.48 24± 1.21
Sanjeevni Banke June 2011 12 13± 0.35 11± 0.27 24± 0.42
June 2012 5 13± 0.38 10± 0.18 24± 0.46
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that cash payments are made to members at doorstep, the promptness of the process seems
remarkable. Promptness could hardly improve if payments should continue to be made
through personal interaction at doorstep, recalling the objective difficulties of travelling to
remote villages and the scarce number of CBHI staff.
Discussion
This paper describes the implementation of two contributory, voluntary, context-adapted and
demand-driven health insurance schemes in rural Nepal. The two locations differ from each
other in many ways: Dhading is hilly whereas Banke is in the plain; Banke is relatively
poorer in terms of MPCC, but has more availability of health-care providers. The differences
were also reflected in the choice of benefit package. Owing to these reasons, instead of
combining the results of two districts, we preferred to show them separately. These
differences notwithstanding, the implementation of CBHI in both locations has been
successful. The implementation model is founded on a partnership model (where all parties
get a share of the productivity gains from pooling) through the application of the following
components: (i) trusted governance at local level; mobilising local rules-in-use and local
staff to manage the mutual model with no or few conflicts of interests typical to insurance;
(ii) combining “awareness chain” (affiliation-enhancing insurance literacy32 with a “value
chain” (comprehensible value proposition of insurance) and with a “competence chain”
(capacity development of local persons); (iii) context-relevance in pricing and priority-
setting of the risks covered, enabling both a contextualised rationing of partial benefits and
gaining credibility by involving prospective enrollees in design and pricing.
The unique feature of this implementation model is its design to achieve three objectives:
(i) enabling target communities to take decisions that affect their members’ lives (in context,
this means deciding on the composition of their benefit package and its price); (ii) enabling
communities to be in control of the money paid by members to the CBHI (to reduce concerns
about leakages, fraud or corruption); and (iii) enabling communities to control that the pre-
defined rules of the game are followed (in context, this means local governance of daily
operations of the insurance). The following five critical conditions serve as benchmarks to
review the success of the schemes in achieving these objectives.
The coverage should deal with risks of the insured
This condition means covering risks that the target group prioritises. The dialog with the
target population on rationing, WTP and priority-setting must be based on local risk-
exposure, that is, morbidity, provision and health-care costs. The data (Tables 6 and 7)
demonstrate significant differences across the two locations, a situation already reported in
other contexts.33 The external change maker was responsible for structuring data acquisition
and calculating premiums for different benefit options (a role requiring statistical and
actuarial expertise), and the target community provided the information and then took the
lead in making choices. The benefits (e.g. hospitalisation, imaging, lab tests, wage loss,
32 Panda et al. (2013).
33 Dror et al. (2008).
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transportation, etc.) were chosen in two stages, first (rough cut) by community leaders,
followed by a selection by small groups; the package selected by most groups was then
retained as the one package applying to all. This interactive process of involving prospective
insureds in package design, while time-consuming and labour-intensive, increased the
population’s understanding about the insurance. The “design workshop” (renamed “redesign
workshop” when repeated the following year) enabled insured members to modify their
choices based on their actual experience. For example, in Dhading in Year 2, members
decided to increase the imaging cap from NPR 500 to 600 and in Banke, from NPR 250 to
600 (Table 2). It is noteworthy that in both schemes and in both years, the outpatient benefits
included represented about half the premium cost (e.g. lab tests and imaging; premium
data not shown). This package composition differs considerably from what most commercial
schemes cover (only inpatient care). Recalling that low enrolment among commercial
“microinsurance” schemes was due to the limited coverage of outpatient care,34 the involve-
ment of CBHI members in package design in these schemes led to a different priority-setting.
The price should be affordable
Affordability is what each target group considers as the acceptable price for its unique variant
of health insurance. We assessed this by obtaining two estimates of WTP, one by applying a
“descending bidding game” (one method of contingent valuation) as part of data collection,
and the second by applying a novel alternative method to proxy WTP for health insurance as
an estimated 4.5 per cent of mean food expenditure.27 The premiums presented to the target
groups in the design workshops were between these two estimates of WTP (see Figures 1
and 2). The members chose benefit packages that commanded premiums closer to the higher
WTP estimate (premiums were NPR 26.2 and 28 in Dhading, and NPR 20 and 35 in Banke,
respectively for the first and second enrolment periods; upper and lower WTP estimates were
NPR 41 and NPR 10 pppm in Dhading; and NPR 38 and 10.46 pppm in Banke). We think
that the lively group discussions (occasioned by involving so many community members in
the process of choice) enhanced the understanding of the trade-off between premiums
payable and the depth and width of coverage, and encouraged agreement to pay higher
premiums in both schemes in the second year. This could suggest that WTP increases when
the insured population gains useful experience with insurance over time (but the effect is not
uniform). It is also noted that the premiums chosen in both locations even in Year 2 are lower
than the highest estimate of WTP.
Another aspect of affordability is that administrative costs did not include profits to
intermediaries or underwriters.
The value proposition of insurance should be positive and clear
We consider membership numbers (new and renewals, Table 4) as a strong indicator of a
positive perception of the value proposition by the target population. In Dhading, member-
ship rose from 514 to 2,060 (+300 per cent) in July 2012 and to 3,363 (+ 554 per cent) by end
January 2013, and in Banke the membership rose from 4,176 in Year 1 to 7,881 in Year 2
(+90 per cent). Renewals were voluntary, and rates were around 66 per cent in Dhading and
34 Pott and Holtz (2013).
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49.4 per cent in Banke; there is scope for improvement. The household size of the target
population was much larger than the average size of insured households (5.2 vs 2.9 lives in
Dhading, and 5.6 vs 2.4 in Banke). The insured members (SRG women) did not avail of the
opportunity to insure all their household members; the under-6 young girls were under-
represented (Table 5). The traditional hierarchy in allocating resources within the family
(lower allocation to girl children) is reflected in this context of considering the value
proposition of insurance. Changing this perception will require more group discussions.
Another aspect of the value proposition of insurance is the share of premiums paid back to
members (loss ratio); these ratios are of course very sensitive to caps, and the increases of
caps for outpatient services that were adopted in Year 2 suggest that the target population
fully understood this relationship. Finally, prompt reimbursement added to the sense of
value, as members were less exposed to secure interim financing through loans.
The process is transparent and trusted by the insured
The transparency of the business process was enhanced by placing the operations of the
scheme in the hands of members chosen by other members for their posts. Putting the
operation and governance in the hands of members (formally a mutual-aid model) removes
some conflicts of interest that exist in the partner-agent model, provided that the managers of
the scheme run it well. The symbiosis between communities (the decision-makers) and the
external facilitator (the change maker) made it possible to deliver tailored training to trusted
officials that the community chose so that they would perform effectively, efficiently and
locally. The training costs are not paid by the community, and the capacity-development
activities are an essential part of this implementation model. The operative assumption
underlying the inclusion of a “competencies chain” in the implementation model is that, with
time, increased autonomy and self-reliance of communities in running their insurance
schemes will allow the phasing out of technical assistance. And the development assumption
is that the front-loaded costs in developing local capacity is a justified and essential phase
towards achieving the development goals of better access to health care by rural people.
Viable supply and solvent demand could be established
The reports of other (micro) health insurance projects in Nepal (referenced earlier) suggest
several unsuccessful attempts, even with external subsidies. The remarkable achievement
reported here is that in similar terrain and difficult conditions, two rural communities,
composed mostly of poor persons with low education and no prior exposure to health
insurance, succeeded in organising and paying for a viable supply of health insurance where
no (commercial) insurer was willing to underwrite risk. Moreover, they did this by respecting
a perfect match between local solvent demand, and local prioritisation of benefits. Thirdly,
the communities demonstrated their ability to govern a scheme transparently and respon-
sibly. The net result was that the communities used new competencies to consolidate all the
conditions to establish and operate a market for health insurance benefitting all concerned
where none existed before. The implementation model does not entail any subsidy to
premiums, yet operations have been sustainable and have grown from year to year. The
technical and actuarial advice provided to the communities during the inception years was
essential in ensuring viable insurance operations. These costs are in fact development costs,
David M. Dror et al.
Implementing Participatory MHI in Nepal
297
to create a nascent market for health insurance; they cannot and should not be borne by the
rural poor, protagonists of this development. In passing, we add that the costs are lower than
benchmarks for operating health insurance in other settings.
This study is subject to certain limitations as well. For one, this study described the
successful operation of two stand-alone CBHIs. Previous studies flagged that small stand-
alone schemes could have solvency issues.35 The Nepali CBHIs are, of course, exposed to
this risk as well. The solution could be creating a mutual reinsurance fund to pool outlier
risks. That option might be politically more pertinent when more people become insured by
CBHIs. Secondly, the analysis of the outcome is using claims data of the first full year, but
the first year may differ from subsequent years.
Conclusions
The argument has been made that poor people demand a development process driven by their
communities.36 This article provides empirical evidence of the development of health
insurance driven by the beneficiary communities in rural Nepal.
After more than two years of operation, the CBHI schemes have been successful in
retaining many/most enrollees beyond the original one-year contract and in attracting many
new enrollees. This was achieved without premium subsidies and on a voluntary basis, as
members agreed to pay health insurance premiums. From a development perspective, this is
a remarkable and rare demonstration that contributory health insurance without premium
subsidies can be attractive to rural poor in a low-income country. It is also a demonstration
that when the target population is involved in priority-setting and pricing, partial coverage
is financially and administratively possible. This voluntary, contributory, needs-based
and demand-driven implementation model met with a very good response at the grassroots
level, and responds to the wishes of the communities to retain decisions, funds, priorities and
operations locally. The experience offers evidence of success in overcoming the single most
challenging obstacle to UHC in the informal sector in low-income countries, namely,
generating contributions from rural poor populations.
This positive evaluation notwithstanding, the verdict is still out whether these CBHI
schemes can keep a similar score in the long term. This is similar to the question, on many
minds, whether the unknown sportsman that hit a new record is the new champion, or maybe
just the one-off lucky beginner. The undisputed facts are the positive results posted and the
small-scale size of these implementations. Can this model be replicated to provide health
insurance coverage to the majority of the Nepalese population living on less than $2 per day?
The answer is unclear at this stage, mainly because scaling will require financial resources to
provide technical assistance to enable communities become the decision-makers and market
makers. The social change of bringing rural persons to manage mutual insurance is not
intuitive, and birthing it must be funded as development aid, not as administrative loading.
Considering that the Government of Nepal intends to reach UHC and must generate
resources through contributions from the beneficiaries, we submit and conclude that the
35 Dror and Armstrong (2006).
36 Narayan et al. (2000).
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CBHI model described here could make a definite contribution to achieving social policy
goals of Nepal.
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Figure A1. Details of the MIA implementation process.
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Figure B1. CHAT board describing various benefit packages, prepared by MIA.
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